



### **3<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on African Swine Fever for Asia**

**&**

### **4<sup>th</sup> Regional Workshop on Swine Disease Control in Asia.**

26-28 November 2019

## **Conclusions**

1. The SGE-ASF Asia acknowledges the obligation of all OIE members to notify in a timely and transparent manner the up to date disease situation on ASF. This information will also assist to facilitate provision of international support to members in need.
2. Transparency in sharing detailed and current information on other topics associated with the ASF situation and control such as:
  - Outbreak management experiences.
  - As there is no effective vaccine for ASF, knowledge of the existence and use of illegal vaccines use should be disclosed.
  - Risky behaviour or practices that may contribute to spread of disease.
  - What laboratory testing is being used and the constraints.at a regional level will improve understanding of the disease and the ability to control ASF in the long term.
3. Any use of illegal vaccines should be investigated and prevented or stopped as swiftly and strongly as possible.
4. Biosecurity is the mainstay of ASF control and prevention. Specific biosecurity guidance is needed for pig farms and along the value chain to manage risk in pig production systems tailored to the Asian region. Members need to adapt these principles to their own situation taking the local socio-economic context into account.

5. The SGE-ASF Asia identified the need to prevent further spread of African swine fever (ASF) to free countries/territories as a key priority for the region and that responsibility needs to be taken by infected as well as free OIE members.
6. Comprehensive risk communication strategies should be part of the ASF prevention and control planning, taking into consideration the guidance provided to Veterinary Services for the development of a communication system, strategic and operational communication plans and elements to assess their quality in [Chapter 3.3 of the OIE Terrestrial Code](#). More detailed good practice guidelines are available in the OIE Communication Handbook for Veterinary Services, available on [www.oie.int/communication\\_handbook](http://www.oie.int/communication_handbook). Messages and tools from the OIE global awareness campaign “ASF kills pigs” can be used and disseminated as part of these strategies.
7. Members should consider ways to monitor public perception and the effectiveness of communication campaigns aimed at changing behaviour as they are an important component of a risk communication strategy. The risk communication section of the WHO’s [Joint External Evaluation tool \(2nd edition\)](#) highlights good practices and systems that could be considered, in particular the risk communication indicator R.5.5 addressing perceptions, risky behaviours and misinformation (page 90).
8. Consultation with experts from different disciplines (such as social and economic sciences, behaviour change, risk assessment) will help to better understand human drivers and assist with design of effective risk communication tools and mechanisms to change behavioural practices that increase the risk of ASFv spread.
9. During the upcoming festive season and other celebration times when there is increased movement of people and food consumption in the region, risk communication activities and heightened vigilance are needed to reduce the risk of ASFv spread within and between countries/territories through transport of pork products by travellers and traders.
10. Official channels for establishing additional methods of dissemination of messages to travellers by passenger carrier companies and staff before and after departure

should be used to further strengthen the effectiveness of awareness raising amongst this target group.

11. Members should work with relevant regulatory bodies and national actors to highlight the significant role of travellers in the global spread of ASFv.
12. The meeting recognizes the need to improve the capacity in the region to conduct socio-economical studies, including cost-effectiveness analyses to evaluate different prevention and control options, which could be addressed in the form of training.
13. The meeting acknowledges the support that FAO and ACIAR/University of Queensland can provide to evaluate different aspects of the impact associated with ASF. Meeting participants will report back to their supervisors and in case of interest, should express their interest to receive support before December 6<sup>th</sup> (via email to: [damian.tagopacheco@fao.org](mailto:damian.tagopacheco@fao.org) and [Yooni.oh@fao.org](mailto:Yooni.oh@fao.org)). Due to limited financial resources, the expressions of interest will be handled on a first-come, first-served basis.
14. The meeting acknowledges the ongoing support provided by OIE Reference Laboratories, and also the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory (OIE Reference Laboratory Elect), in providing confirmatory diagnosis of ASF. Members wishing to send samples should contact a relevant OIE Reference Laboratory or Dr David Williams ([D.Williams@csiro.au](mailto:D.Williams@csiro.au)) at AAHL.
15. ASF is a threat to UNSDGs. Members need to work together and actively seek opportunities for engaging high-level policy makers (e.g. ASEAN+3 Agriculture Ministers Platform) to strengthen political awareness and commit national resource allocation for ASF control.
16. The Workshop thanked and expressed its high appreciation to the Department of Animal Health and the Government of Vietnam for hosting the meeting and acknowledges the efforts made by Vietnam to control ASF, report disease in a transparent way and collaborate with international organizations such as OIE and

FAO, contributing to regional initiatives, such as the SGE-ASF, and with other countries to advance the understanding of ASF for better control of the disease.

17. The Republic of Korea agreed to host the next meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on ASF for Asia, tentatively to be held in the 1st semester of 2020 with the proposed technical topic to be outbreak management.