Recommendations on biosecurity
SGE on ASF GF TADs Europe

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President GF-TADs-Europe
Introduction / Reminder

Regional governance → Regional **Steering Committee** of the GF-TADs for Europe

**Composition**

President: B. Van Goethem (EC)
Vicepresidents: E. Nepoklonov (RF), U. Herzog (AT)
Members:
- OIE – FAO - WHO
- Countries (4): RF – KZ – AT* - BE
- Bureau of the OIE Regional Commission for Europe (4)
- Regional Specialised Organisations: EC - EuFMD – REMESA
- Donors (EU, France, Italy, etc)
- Observers (ad hoc)

**Meetings**

- RSC1 (Paris, October 2005)
- RSC2 (Paris, December 2007)
- RSC3 (Brussels, February 2010)
- RSC4 (Brussels, January 2012)
- RSC5 (Brussels, October 2013)
- RSC6 (Brussels, September 2015)
- RSC7 (Brussels, October 2017)
- RSC8 (Tbilisi, September 2018)
Standing Group of Experts on ASF

**Members (2019):**

- **countries:**
  - Belarus
  - Bulgaria
  - Estonia
  - Latvia
  - Moldova
  - Romania
  - Ukraine
  - Belgium
  - Czech Republic*
  - Hungary
  - Lithuania
  - Poland
  - Russian Federation

- **organisations:**
  - EC
  - OIE
  - FAO

**Secretariat:** OIE sub-regional Representation in Brussels

**Observers:**
- Any country in the Region
- Selected stakeholders
- African Swine Fever situation (June 2017 – July 2019)

Infected European countries in 2017-2019:
- Estonia
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Moldova
- Poland
- Russia
- Ukraine
- Czech Republic*
- Hungary
- Romania
- Belgium
- Italy
Recent ASF situation

(January – July 2019)

Infected European countries in 2019:
- Estonia
- Latvia
- Lithuania
- Moldova
- Poland
- Russia
- Ukraine
- Hungary
- Romania
- Belgium
- Italy
Standing Group of Experts on **ASF**

**Objectives:**

to build up a closer cooperation among countries affected by African swine fever (ASF) and thereby, address the disease in a more collaborative and harmonised manner across the Baltic and Eastern Europe sub-region.

**Actions:**

— Regular exchange of information on the ASF situation and control measures applied, both as regards the domestic pig sector and wild boar;
— Regular review of national control strategies by experts based on scientific risk assessments, experience and best practice in the region, with a view to harmonising control policies and building a science based regional control strategy;
— Collaboration on laboratory diagnostics (exchange of best practice on methodology; support and training / capacity building as needed);
— Collaboration on awareness raising campaigns in the affected countries (exchange of best practice and communication tools).
Activities of the Standing Group of Experts on ASF

Technical guidance based on science provided

Technical meetings with renowned experts providing key recommendations on:
- Wild boar
- Biosecurity
- Control measures
- Stamping out procedures; carcass disposal and disinfection
- ASF risk communication, laboratory diagnostics/capability
- Preparedness
- Cross border cooperation, legal and irregular movements of pigs/ products
- Awareness, communication

Country situation and control measures assessed

All countries assessment missions by renowned experts

Trust among countries in the sub-region increased

Coordination meetings

Prevention and control capacity of countries (to be) improved

Capacity building programme under development (BTSF workshops)
Standing Group of Experts on **ASF**

**Meetings of the SGE ASF – main issue discussed (2014-2019)**

- Kick-off meeting (Bern, September 2014) Launching
- SGE ASF1 (Minsk, Belarus, December 2014) ASF management in Wild Boars
- SGE ASF2 (Tallinn, Estonia, February 2015) BIOSECURITY in pig production systems (including backyard)
- SGE ASF3 (Moscow, Russia, March 2016) Present and discuss findings of the SGE ASF missions conducted by experts
- SGE ASF4 (Paris, France, May 2016) Discuss any new development with regards to ASF epidemiology in the region
- SGE ASF5 (Lisbon, Portugal, September 2016) Revise evolution of epidemiological situation and control measures in place.
- SGE ASF6 (Vilnius, Lithuania, November 2016) Depopulation/stamping out procedures; practical aspects carcass disposal, disinfection
- SGE ASF7 (Paris, France, May 2017) updates on epidemiological ASF situation; and preventive and control measures
- SGE ASF8 (Chisinau, Moldova, September 2017) ASF risk communication’, and 'laboratory diagnostics and capability
- SGE ASF9 (Kiev, Ukraine, March 2018) Cross border cooperation addressing (legal and) irregular movements of pigs and products
- SGE ASF10 (Paris, France, May 2018) update on epidemiological situation and control measures
- SGE ASF11 (Warsaw, Poland, September 2018) in depth review of the current knowledge on wild boar eradication ASF: focus on the Czech Republic experience
- SGE ASF12 (Prague, Czech Rep., March 2019) tbd
Standing Group of Experts on ASF

GF-TADs experts missions in the countries:

- March 2015 - Lithuania
- April 2015 - Belarus
- May 2015 - Latvia
- July 2015 - Russia
- September 2015 - Ukraine
- September 2015 - Estonia
- October 2015 - Poland
- October 2016 - Moldova
- October 2017 - Czech Republic
- December 2017 - Romania
- January 2019 - Bulgaria

GF-TADs experts:

- Silvia Bellini
- Vittorio Guberti
- Klaus Depner
- Konstantin Gruzdev
- Sergei Khomenko
- Marius Masilius
- Ago Pärtel
- Aleksey Igolkin
- Petr Šatrán
- Krzysztof Jaźdżewski
Recommendations on biosecurity

- Biosecurity in pig production systems
- Hunting biosecurity
- Biosecurity during stamping out
- Biosecurity in the laboratory
- Biosecurity at the borders
Recommendations SFE GFTADS Europe on Biosecurity in pig production systems (I)

The SGE ASF2 (Tallinn, Estonia - 11-12 February 2015) focused on BIOSECURITY in pig production systems (including backyard):

- Biosecurity is of crucial importance to prevent the entry and spread of ASF in pig holdings, both in the commercial and so called backyard pig sectors. **There are minimum biosecurity measures that need to be and can easily be implemented even by smallholder pig owners**, such as restricting access to visitors, preventing contact between domestic pigs and wild boar, using separate shoes and clothes when entering the pig house, and having disinfectants ready on site. Precondition to achieve this is for the Veterinary Services to provide basic information to pig holders by way of appropriate communication campaigns;

- Backyard holdings with low bio-security in place are currently playing an important role in the spread of ASF. Given the economic relevance of these holdings in certain areas, **the control and biosecurity measures to be applied in such production systems need to be carefully evaluated** (annex);

- There are **different ways/strategies to strengthen and promote biosecurity measures**, including **positive stimulus for compliant holdings**, that should be applied taking into account the different levels of risks of each type of holding, area(zone) and in peace/emergency/endemic situation. Failure to comply may entail **enforcement measures including administrative sanctions or other actions**.
Recommendations SFE GFTADS Europe on Biosecurity in pig production systems (I)

The SGE ASF2 (Tallinn, Estonia - 11-12 February 2015) focused on BIOSECURITY in pig production systems (including backyard):

Measures to minimize the risk of ASF introduction into a pig holding

- No swill feeding;
- Pigs should be introduced from trusted and certified sources;
- Visitors should be discouraged to enter the pig holdings, specially the commercial ones;
- Personnel should be well trained/informed and contacts with other pigs or wildboar forbidden,
- Perimeter fencing preventing contact with feral pigs (double fences) should be install on a pig holding in outdoor farms;
- Carcasses, discarded parts from slaughtered pigs and food waste should be disposed off in an appropriate manner;
- No part of any feral pig, whether shot or found dead should be brought into a pig holding;
- Sharing of equipment and tools between the holdings should be avoided;
- Appropriate means for cleaning and disinfection have to be placed at the entrance of the holdings. Effective disinfectants shall be available in the holding;
- Vehicles and equipment should be properly cleaned and disinfected before entering into contact with pigs and leaving the holdings; however in general they should not enter the holding;
- Appropriate hygiene measures have to be applied by all persons entering into contact with pigs (domestic and/or feral)
Recommnedations SFE GFTADS Europe on hunting biosecurity

The SGE ASF6 (Vilnius, Lithuania, 28-29 November 2016) devoted time to practical aspects related to carcass disposal and disinfection of holdings:

Measures to minimize the risk of ASF spread by hunting:

- **Regional and/or local trainings and awareness campaigns** be provided to hunting community, forestry and environment agencies and Veterinary Services (public and private components) should be organised with the support of experts as soon as possible, to ensure that common disease prevention, biosecurity and eradication goals are understood and shared.

- **Hunted wild boar should remain in the premises of the hunting ground until tested; only negative carcasses must be released. The carcasses should be individually identified.**

- **Unless a specific hygienic removal protocol is in place, offal from hunted wild boar should not be removed from the animal in the field,** which should be brought to dedicated authorised dressing facilities in the hunting ground equipped with water, waste collection equipment and freezers. Transport of hunted animals to the dressing facility should be carried out using only properly equipped vehicles. Dressing rooms should have sufficient effective disinfectants available.
Recommendations SFE GFTADS Europe on biosecurity during stamping out

The SGE ASF6 (Vilnius, Lithuania, 28-29 November 2016) devoted time to depopulation/stamping out procedures and disinfection of holdings:

Measures to minimize the risk of ASF spread during stamping out:

- Disinfection techniques should comprise thorough **soaking of bedding and litter as well as faecal matter with the disinfectant**; washing and cleaning by careful brushing and scrubbing of the ground, floors and walls; then further washing with the disinfectant; washing and disinfecting the outside of vehicles.

- **The choice of disinfectants and of procedures for disinfection should be made taking into account the causal agents of infection** and the nature of the premises, vehicles and objects which are to be treated. **Specific precautions should be taken in case of freezing temperatures.** For ASF virus inactivation, recommended disinfectants are listed in the OIE technical disease Card.
Recommendations SFE GFTADS Europe on biosecurity in the laboratory

SGE8 (Chisinau, Moldova, 20-21 September 2017) was dedicated partially to laboratory diagnostics and capability:

Measures to minimize the risk of ASF from laboratories:
• Reference laboratories should have the **adequate biosecurity level to deal with either liver virus or inactivated samples.**
• Diagnostic labs performing **routine screening tests for surveillance purposes may operate under biosecurity level 2.**
Recommendations SFE GFTADS Europe on biosecurity at the borders

SGE ASF9 (Kiev, Ukraine, 22-23 March 2018) was dedicated to Cross border cooperation addressing (legal and) irregular movements of pigs and their products

Measures to minimize the risk of entry/spread of ASF at borders:

• Coordinated border management among border Inspection posts and customs officials should be encouraged in order to tighten the cooperation among these two bodies across the border and within the country.

• Specific visible tools and procedures should be in place at border checkpoints in order to screen the required number of travellers and consignments to fight/control illegal movements. In addition to awareness campaigns, amnesty bins should be displayed at borders as incentive measures to get rid of at risk products. A system for recovering costs or setting deterrent fines should be in place.

• In order to optimise the use of available resources, risk analysis and risk profiling for borders control personal luggage and vehicles should be carried out.

• Empty animal trucks should be disinfected according to a well-defined procedures, using disinfectants recommended by OIE and the competent authorities should be informed in order to enhance cross border coordination on these procedures. The disinfection procedure can take place in a different location other than the border check point or the edge of the restricted area.
More information (dedicated webpage):